## L07b Complexity of Computing NE

CS 280 Algorithmic Game Theory Ioannis Panageas

Inspired and some figures by C. Daskalakis slides and T. Roughgarden notes

#### Warm-up: Reductions in NP

#### Example: **INDEPENDENT SET (IS) Problem**

Given a simple undirected graph  $G(V, E)$  and k, is there an independent set in G of size  $\geq k$ . Independent set is called a set  $I \subset V$  of vertices such that pairwise the vertices in  $I$  are not connected.



#### Warm-up: Reductions in NP

#### Example: **INDEPENDENT SET (IS) Problem**

Given a simple undirected graph  $G(V, E)$  and k, is there an independent set in G of size  $\geq k$ . Independent set is called a set  $I \subset V$  of vertices such that pairwise the vertices in  $I$  are not connected.



Claim: INDEPENDENT SET is **NP-complete**.

Proof: (1) INDEPENDENT SET **belongs** to NP (why?). (2) Reduce 3-SAT to INDEPENDENT SET. Since 3-SAT is NPhard, INDEPENDENT SET is NP-hard.

#### Warm-up: Reductions in NP

#### Example: **INDEPENDENT SET (IS) Problem**

Given a simple undirected graph  $G(V, E)$  and k, is there an independent set in G of size  $\geq k$ . Independent set is called a set  $I \subset V$  of vertices such that pairwise the vertices in  $I$  are not connected.



#### **Problem: 3-SAT**

Given a Boolean expression  $E$ , such that  $E$  is a conjunction of clauses, where each clause is a disjunction of exactly 3 literals, is  $E$  satisfiable?

#### **Problem: 3-SAT**

- Given a Boolean expression  $E$ , such that  $E$  is a conjunction of clauses, where each clause is a disjunction of exactly 3 literals, is  $E$  satisfiable?
- A **literal** is a Boolean expression consisting of just a single Boolean variable, or the negation of a Boolean variable.
- Example: " $-x_1$ " and " $x_2$ " are literals.

A **clause** is a Boolean expression of the form " $\ell_1 \vee \ell_2 \vee \cdots \vee \ell_k$ ", i.e. a **disjunction** of some literals  $\ell_1, \ell_2, ..., \ell_k$ . In 3-SAT  $k = 3$ .

Example: " $C_1 \equiv x_1 \vee \neg x_2 \vee x_3$ " is a clause.

A Boolean expression is a conjunction of clauses. Example: " $E \equiv C_1 \wedge C_2 \wedge C_3$ " is a clause.

Satisfiability: Can you assign True, False to the variables so that the expression is True?

**Theorem** (3-SAT is NP-complete). The 3-SAT problem is NP-complete!

Satisfiability: Can you assign True, False to the variables so that the expression is True?

**Theorem** (3-SAT is NP-complete). The 3-SAT problem is NP-complete!

 $E = (x_1 \vee \bar{x}_2 \vee \bar{x}_3) \wedge (\bar{x}_1 \vee x_2 \vee x_3) \wedge (\bar{x}_1 \vee x_2 \vee \bar{x}_3) \wedge (x_1 \vee \bar{x}_2 \vee x_3)$ 

Satisfiability: Can you assign True, False to the variables so that the expression is True?

**Theorem** (3-SAT is NP-complete). The 3-SAT problem is NP-complete!

 $C_1$ <br>  $E = (x_1 \vee \bar{x}_2 \vee \bar{x}_3) \wedge (\bar{x}_1 \vee x_2 \vee x_3) \wedge (\bar{x}_1 \vee x_2 \vee \bar{x}_3) \wedge (x_1 \vee \bar{x}_2 \vee x_3)$ 



Claim: Expression  $E$  with  $k$  clauses is satisfiable if and only if the induced graph G has an IS of size  $k$ .

Therefore, given a **graph G and a**  $k$ , if we can identify in **poly-time** if there exists an **Independent Set of size at least k**, then we can solve **in poly-time 3-SAT**.

Claim: Expression  $E$  with  $k$  clauses is satisfiable if and only if the induced graph G has an IS of size  $k$ .

Therefore, given a **graph G and a**  $k$ , if we can identify in **poly-time** if there exists an **Independent Set of size at least k**, then we can solve **in poly-time 3-SAT**.

> 3-SAT  $\leq_p$  INDEPENDENT SET  $\Rightarrow$ **INDEPENDENT SET is NP-complete!**

Claim: Expression  $E$  with  $k$  clauses is satisfiable if and only if the induced graph G has an IS of size  $k$ .

Therefore, given a **graph G and a k**, if we can identify in **poly-time** if there exists an **Independent Set of size at least k**, then we can solve **in poly-time 3-SAT**.

3-SAT  $\leq_p$  INDEPENDENT SET  $\Rightarrow$  INDEPENDENT SET is NP-complete!

Question: Can the problem of computing a Nash Equilibrium be NPcomplete?

Claim: Expression  $E$  with  $k$  clauses is satisfiable if and only if the induced graph G has an IS of size  $k$ .

Therefore, given a **graph** *G* **and a**  $k$ , if we can identify in **poly-time** if there exists an **Independent Set of size at least k**, then we can solve **in poly-time 3-SAT**.

3-SAT  $\leq_p$  INDEPENDENT SET  $\Rightarrow$  INDEPENDENT SET is NP-complete!

Question: Can the problem of computing a Nash Equilibrium be NPcomplete?

Answer: (Megiddo) Suppose we have a reduction from SAT to NASH, s.t any solution to the instance of NASH tells us whether or not the SAT instance has a solution. Then we could turn this into a nondeterministic algorithm for verifying that an instance of SAT has no solution: Just guess a solution of the NASH instance, and check that it indeed implies that the SAT instance has no solution.  $NP = co-NP$  (unlikely).

PLS (Polynomial-time Local Search) is a complexity class intended to exemplify local search problems. An abstract local search problem is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms.

Canonical Problem: LOCAL MAX-CUT

Given an undirected graph  $G = (V, E)$  with non-negative weights  $w_e$  on edges, find a cut  $(S, \overline{S})$  that maximizes the total weight of cut edges. You are allowed to do only local moves that improve the objective, i.e., moving one vertex  $\nu$  from one side of the cut to the other that improves the total weight of cut edges.

PLS (Polynomial-time Local Search) is a complexity class intended to exemplify local search problems. An abstract local search problem is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms.

Canonical Problem: LOCAL MAX-CUT

Given an undirected graph  $G = (V, E)$  with non-negative weights  $w_e$  on edges, find a cut  $(S, \overline{S})$  that maximizes the total weight of cut edges. You are allowed to do only local moves that improve the objective, i.e., moving one vertex  $\nu$  from one side of the cut to the other that improves the total weight of cut edges.

Remark: (classic) MAX-CUT is NP-Complete.

PLS (Polynomial-time Local Search) is a complexity class intended to exemplify local search problems. An abstract local search problem is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms.

1. The first algorithm takes as input an instance and outputs an arbitrary feasible solution (for LOCAL MAX-CUT this is an arbitrary cut).

PLS (Polynomial-time Local Search) is a complexity class intended to exemplify local search problems. An abstract local search problem is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms.

- 1. The first algorithm takes as input an instance and outputs an arbitrary feasible solution (for LOCAL MAX-CUT this is an arbitrary cut).
- 2. The second algorithm takes as input an instance and a feasible solution, and returns the objective function value of the solution (for LOCAL MAX-CUT it is the sum of the total weight of the edges crossing the cut).

PLS (Polynomial-time Local Search) is a complexity class intended to exemplify local search problems. An abstract local search problem is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms.

- 1. The first algorithm takes as input an instance and outputs an arbitrary feasible solution (for LOCAL MAX-CUT this is an arbitrary cut).
- 2. The second algorithm takes as input an instance and a feasible solution, and returns the objective function value of the solution (for LOCAL MAX-CUT it is the sum of the total weight of the edges crossing the cut).
- 3. The third algorithm takes as input an instance and a feasible solution and either reports "locally optimal" or produces a better solution (for LOCAL MAX-CUT it checks all possible  $|V|$  moves. If one improves the objective choose that move).

Theorem (Local Max-cut is PLS-complete). The LOCAL MAX-CUT problem is PLS-complete.

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

*Proof.* We show first that PNE CONGESTION GAMES  $\in$  PLS.

Describe the three algorithms:

• First algorithm takes as input a congestion game and returns an arbitrary strategy profile (e.g., all agents choose first path).

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

*Proof.* We show first that PNE CONGESTION GAMES  $\in$  PLS.

Describe the three algorithms:

- First algorithm takes as input a congestion game and returns an arbitrary strategy profile (e.g., all agents choose first path).
- Second algorithm takes a congestion game and a strategy profile  $s$ , and returns the value of the potential function  $\Phi(s) = \sum_{e} \sum_{i=1}^{l_e(s)} c_e(j)$ .

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

*Proof.* We show first that PNE CONGESTION GAMES  $\in$  PLS.

Describe the three algorithms:

- First algorithm takes as input a congestion game and returns an arbitrary strategy profile (e.g., all agents choose first path).
- Second algorithm takes a congestion game and a strategy profile  $s$ , and returns the value of the potential function  $\Phi(s) = \sum_{e} \sum_{j=1}^{l_e(s)} c_e(j)$ .
- The third algorithm checks if the given strategy profile  $s$  is a PNE; if not, we find an agent i that deviates from  $s_i$  to another pure  $s'_i$  and decreases her utility. Then  $\Phi(s'_i, s_{-i}) < \Phi(s_i, s_{-i})$ . This can be done polynomial time in the description of the game.

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

Proof cont. We now reduce LOCAL MAX-CUT to PNE CONGESTION GAMES.

Given a weighted graph  $G(V, E)$  we define the following congestion game:

• Agents are the vertices  $V$ .

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

*Proof cont.* We now reduce LOCAL MAX-CUT to PNE CONGESTION GAMES.

Given a weighted graph  $G(V, E)$  we define the following congestion game:

- Agents are the vertices  $V$ .
- For each edge  $e \in E$  we have two resources  $r_e$ ,  $\overline{r}_e$  (2|E| resources in total).

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

*Proof cont.* We now reduce LOCAL MAX-CUT to PNE CONGESTION GAMES.

Given a weighted graph  $G(V, E)$  we define the following congestion game:

- Agents are the vertices  $V$ .
- For each edge  $e \in E$  we have two resources  $r_e$ ,  $\overline{r}_e$  (2|E| resources in total).
- Each player  $v$  has two strategies,  $s_v = \{r_e : e \text{ is incident to } v\}$  and  $\overline{s}_v = \{\overline{r}_e : e \text{ is incident to } v\}.$

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

*Proof cont.* We now reduce LOCAL MAX-CUT to PNE CONGESTION GAMES.

Given a weighted graph  $G(V, E)$  we define the following congestion game:

- Agents are the vertices  $V$ .
- For each edge  $e \in E$  we have two resources  $r_e$ ,  $\overline{r}_e$  (2|E| resources in total).
- Each player  $v$  has two strategies,  $s_v = \{r_e : e \text{ is incident to } v\}$  and  $\overline{s}_v = \{\overline{r}_e : e \text{ is incident to } v\}.$
- The cost  $c_{r_e}/c_{\overline{r}_e}$  of a resource  $r_e$  or  $\overline{r}_e$  is 0 if one agent uses it and  $w_e$  if two players use it.

This transformation is poly-time.

**Theorem** (PNE in congestion games is PLS-complete). The problem of computing Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games is PLS-complete.

*Proof cont.* We now reduce LOCAL MAX-CUT to PNE CONGESTION GAMES.



Each agent has two strategies, red and green.

Say agents  $v_1, v_2$  choose red and  $v_3, v_4$  choose green. Cost of  $v_1, v_2$  is  $w_{e_1}$  and of  $v_3, v_4$  is  $w_{e_5}$ .

*Proof cont.* Observe that there is a bijection between strategy profiles of this congestion game and cuts of the given graph  $G$ .

*Proof cont.* Observe that there is a bijection between strategy profiles of this congestion game and cuts of the given graph G. Given a cut  $(S,\overline{S})$  (agents in S choose red and agents in  $\overline{S}$  choose green strategy), we have that

$$
w(S,\overline{S}) = \sum_{e=(u,v):u\in S,v\in\overline{S}} w_e = \sum_{e\in E} w_e - \Phi(s,\overline{s}).
$$

*Proof cont.* Observe that there is a bijection between strategy profiles of this congestion game and cuts of the given graph G. Given a cut  $(S,\overline{S})$  (agents in S choose red and agents in  $\overline{S}$  choose green strategy), we have that

$$
w(S,\overline{S}) = \sum_{e=(u,v):u\in S,v\in\overline{S}} w_e = \sum_{e\in E} w_e - \Phi(s,\overline{s}).
$$

Therefore:

- Cuts with larger weight correspond to strategy profiles with smaller potential.
- Local maxima of cuts of  $G$  correspond to local minima of the potential function.

#### The class PPAD

Suppose that an exponentially large graph with vertex set  $\{0,1\}^n$ (i.e,  $2^n$  vertices) is defined by two circuits:



#### The class PPAD

Suppose that an exponentially large graph with vertex set  $\{0,1\}^n$ (i.e,  $2^n$  vertices) is defined by two circuits:



Canonical Problem:

**END OF THE LINE:** Given  $P, N$ : If  $0^n$  is an unbalanced node, find another unbalanced node. Otherwise return  $0^n$ .

**PPAD** (Papadimitriou 94'): All problems in FNP reducible to END OF THE LINE.































Proof cont.

- The walk cannot exit the outer triangle  $(\text{why?})$ .
- The walk does not contain  $\rho$  shapes (why?).



Proof cont.

- The walk cannot exit the outer triangle  $(\text{why?})$ .
- The walk does not contain  $\rho$  shapes (why?).

The walk will terminate incide somewhere! That small triangle should be trichromatic!

Proof cont.

- The walk cannot exit the outer triangle  $(\text{why?})$ .
- The walk does not contain  $\rho$  shapes (why?).

Sperner's Lemma can be generalized for higher dimensions. SPERNER problem is like END OF THE LINE!

te incide somewhere! ould be trichromatic!



#### BROUWER

**Definition** (BROUWER). The problem BROUWER is defined below:

**Input:** A poly-time algorithm  $\Pi_F$  for the evaluation of a function  $F:[0,1]^m \to [0,1]^m$ , a constant K such that F is K-Lipschitz and accuracy  $\epsilon$ .

**Output:** A (rational) point  $x$  so that

$$
||F(x)-x||_{\infty}\leq \epsilon,
$$

i.e.,  $x$  is an approximate fixed point.

#### BROUWER

**Definition** (BROUWER). The problem BROUWER is defined below:

**Input:** A poly-time algorithm  $\Pi_F$  for the evaluation of a function  $F:[0,1]^m \to [0,1]^m$ , a constant K such that F is K-Lipschitz and accuracy  $\epsilon$ .

**Output:** A (rational) point  $x$  so that

$$
||F(x)-x||_{\infty}\leq \epsilon,
$$

i.e.,  $x$  is an approximate fixed point.

We will show that

#### $\texttt{BROUWER}\to\texttt{SPERNER}$

Let  $F : [0,1]^2 \rightarrow [0,1]^2$ . By uniform continuity there exists a  $\delta(\epsilon)$  so that

$$
||x - y||_{\infty} \le \delta \Rightarrow ||F(x) - F(y)||_{\infty} \le \epsilon.
$$



Diameter of each cell is at most  $\delta(\epsilon)$ 

Let  $F : [0,1]^2 \rightarrow [0,1]^2$ . By uniform continuity there exists a  $\delta(\epsilon)$  so that

$$
||x - y||_{\infty} \le \delta \Rightarrow ||F(x) - F(y)||_{\infty} \le \epsilon.
$$



Let  $F : [0,1]^2 \rightarrow [0,1]^2$ . By uniform continuity there exists a  $\delta(\epsilon)$  so that

$$
||x - y||_{\infty} \le \delta \Rightarrow ||F(x) - F(y)||_{\infty} \le \epsilon.
$$

![](_page_53_Figure_3.jpeg)

Diameter of each cell is at most  $\delta(\epsilon)$ 

Color the nodes of the triangulation according to the direction of  $f(x) - x$ .

![](_page_53_Figure_6.jpeg)

Tie-break at the boundary angles, so that the resulting coloring respects the boundary conditions!

**Claim.** Choose  $\delta = \min(\delta(\epsilon), \epsilon)$  and let  $v^y$  be the yellow vertex of a trichromatic triangle. It holds that

$$
||F(v^y) - v^y||_{\infty} \leq 2\epsilon.
$$

![](_page_54_Figure_3.jpeg)

Diameter of each cell is at most  $\delta(\epsilon)$ 

Color the nodes of the triangulation according to the direction of  $f(x) - x$ .

![](_page_54_Figure_6.jpeg)

Tie-break at the boundary angles, so that the resulting coloring respects the boundary conditions!

#### 2D BROUWER reduction to SPERNER Claim. Chod ellow

This will be in HW2.

 $\mathbb{H}^I$  (  $U$ 

![](_page_55_Figure_1.jpeg)

vertex of a tri

Diameter of each cell is at most  $\delta(\epsilon)$ 

Color the nodes of the triangulation according to the direction of  $f(x) - x$ .

![](_page_55_Figure_4.jpeg)

 $\mathbf{v} \cdot \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{v}$ 

Tie-break at the boundary angles, so that the resulting coloring respects the boundary conditions!

We will not see the proof, just an idea.

We will not see the proof, just an idea.

Consider the  $2 \times 2$  mathcing pennies.

![](_page_57_Picture_43.jpeg)

Consider the function  $f$  from the proof of Nash.

$$
f_{is_i}(x) = \frac{x_i(s_i) + \max\{u_i(s_i; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}{1 + \sum_{s' \in S_i} \max\{u_i(s'; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}
$$

![](_page_58_Picture_24.jpeg)

Draw the vector field for  $f(x) - x$ .

![](_page_58_Picture_3.jpeg)

$$
f_{is_i}(x) = \frac{x_i(s_i) + \max\{u_i(s_i; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}{1 + \sum_{s' \in S_i} \max\{u_i(s'; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}
$$
\n**1, -1**\n**1, 1**\n**1, -1**\n**1, 1**\n**1, -1**\n**1, -1**\n**1, -1**\n**1, -1**

#### Draw the vector field for  $f(x) - x$ .

![](_page_59_Picture_3.jpeg)

Color the points according to

![](_page_59_Figure_5.jpeg)

$$
f_{is_i}(x) = \frac{x_i(s_i) + \max\{u_i(s_i; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}{1 + \sum_{s' \in S_i} \max\{u_i(s'; x_{-i}) - u_i(x), 0\}}
$$
 1, -1

#### Draw the vector field for  $f(x) - x$ . Color the points according to

![](_page_60_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_60_Figure_5.jpeg)

![](_page_61_Picture_29.jpeg)

Draw the vector field for  $f(x) - x$ . Color the points according to

![](_page_61_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_62_Figure_0.jpeg)

Theorem ((NASH is PPAD-complete) Daskalakis, Goldberg, Papadimitriou). NASH is PPAD-complete.

![](_page_63_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_64_Figure_0.jpeg)